Brooke Holmes, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), ISBN: 978-0691138992 by Schlosser, Joel Alden
  
196 
 
 
 
 Joel Alden Schlosser 2012 
ISSN: 1832-5203 
Foucault Studies, No. 13, pp. 196-200, May 2012 
 
REVIEW 
 
Brooke Holmes, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence of the Physical Body in 
Ancient Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), ISBN: 978-0691138992 
 
The task of genealogy, Michel Foucault once wrote, consists in the recovery of “a body totally 
imprinted by history.”1  Foucault’s own corpus traces this imprinting in economics, biology, 
psychiatry, medicine, and penology—but what of the body itself?  Where does “the body,” as 
concept and as object, come from? 
In her ambitious and compelling new study, The Symptom and the Subject: The Emergence 
of the Physical Body in Ancient Greece, Brooke Holmes sets out to answer these questions by tur-
ning to classical antiquity and, primarily, the medical writers of the sixth through fourth 
century BCE.  While it may seem rather obvious to locate the invention of the body alongside 
the invention of medicine as a discipline, Holmes’ book offers a subtle and illuminating gene-
alogy of how the body, understood as sōma, comes into view through the interpretation of 
symptoms.  These “strange messengers from strange lands,” (124) symptoms are interpreted 
by ancient physicians in order to envision an interior space, a cavity, where diseases and 
afflictions bubble and boil, prone to daemonic forces and the gods as well as human inter-
vention.  Offering its symptoms to interpretation, the body emerges as an imagined space, “a 
largely hidden world of fluids, stuffs, flesh, bones, joints and organs,” loosely organized by an 
idea of nature (phusis) and yet also amenable to the diagnostic art (technē) of medicine. (1)  This 
is a body, much like Foucault’s, that has a kind of self-contradictory power, possessing both its 
own agency while also remaining an inert, susceptible object.  Accessed only through ambi-
guous symptoms, however, this body always remains at least partially shrouded, despite later 
Western attempts to control it with practices of self or by subordinating it to a kingly soul. 
Such a vision of the body differs sharply from the body in Homer’s epics.  There, as 
Holmes explains, symptoms are understood mostly in magico-religious terms, where the af-
fections (or antipathies) of particular gods explain illness and affliction.  When disease strikes, 
barely ten lines into the Iliad, the plague comes through Apollo’s archetypal bow and arrows: 
“He came as night comes down and knelt then / apart and opposite the ships and let go an 
arrow. / Terrible was the clash that rose from the bow of silver.” (48)  The relationship between 
god and human is always deeply asymmetrical: the gods can strike from afar, without war-
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Bouchard (ed.), Language, Counter-memory, Practice: 
Selected essays and reviews (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 48.  Quoted in Brooke Holmes, The Symp-
tom and the Subject, 4. Page numbers in the following paragraphs refer to Holmes. 
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ning, and leaving no means of reprise.  Human beings in the Homeric epics are thus always 
susceptible to divine attack: “Atē, the godsent folly that leads one astray and the ruin that 
follows, walks with delicate feet on the heads of men.” (54) 
Yet Holmes convincingly shows that rather than destroying all sense of the person, this 
magico-religious framework helped to constitute the boundaries of a self.  Contesting the 
reading advanced by Bruno Snell that sōma consists merely of an inert and peripheral object 
discovered in contrast to the mind, Holmes examines “the prehistory of sōma” in the Homeric 
epics.  Sōma, on her reading, becomes a “point of tension between life and death”: in the Odys-
sey, sōma describes dead bodies forgotten, abandoned, and uncared for (32) and flesh denied 
burial “is the raw nerve of the Iliad’s final books.” (34)  Sōma thus marks the site where cha-
racters negotiate both the integrity of the person and the collapse into formlessness at death.  
Returning to the poems, Holmes shows how the interpretation of symptoms, even within the 
magico-religious framework, led to conceptualizing the body in terms of the “seen” and the 
“felt.”  After his death in the Iliad, Hector appears to the Achaeans as a “three-dimensional, pe-
netrable object;” (42) here the body is “seen,” distinguished by its breeding and appearance.  
Alternatively, the body is “felt” as a unity, but one that daemonic energies can cut across and 
violate.  Patroclus, moments before his death, is struck from behind by Apollo, revealing a po-
rousness in his body different from that of the human form.  A feeling, a sensation more than 
something tangible, transgresses Patroclus.  Thus, while daemonic forces and gods hold re-
sponsibility for disease, illness, and possession, even in Homer an inchoate concept of the 
body, marked by the charged sense of sōma, presents itself through the interpretations of 
symptoms: either seen in terms of “the structure of the person and the skin, as well as the flesh 
and bones revealed by a deep wound,” on the one hand, or felt through “the cognitive-
affective dimen-sion of the person… surges of strength, emotions, thoughts, breath, and so on” 
on the other. (59) 
The medical writers of the sixth through fourth centuries, whose work formed what is 
known as the “Hippocratic corpus,” extend and transform the incipient complexity of the 
body in Homer.  Arrogating the authority of the Homeric poems, these writings re-concep-
tualize the unseen world onto which symptoms opened by rooting their interpretations in 
nature, thus transferring power from unseen social agents—gods and daemons—to im-
personal forces such as air, water, earth, and fire.  Concomitantly, the body emerges as a con-
ceptual object determined by these natural forces.  Whereas sōma possessed a narrow semantic 
field in the Homeric epics, it comes to describe both animate and inanimate objects for the 
medical writers: sōma appears as an object, even while medical writers acknowledge the dif-
ference between the person and the body, but also the respective power and agency of each. 
In this way, the sōma of the medical writers contains within itself a contradiction.  It is 
both an object that can be tamed, yet also a kind of subject capable of erupting unexpectedly. 
This contradiction grows more pressing as medical writers seek to explain the interval 
between cause and effect, that is, to conceptualize what actually happens in the mysterious 
cavity itself.  On the one hand, ancient physicians transfer causal responsibility to unseen stuff 
inside the cavity, incorporating the magico-religious interpretations evident in the Homeric 
epics and creating the body as its own object apart from the social world.  Yet on the other 
hand, these same medical writers leave space for the operations of chance (tuchē) and the 
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spontaneous (to automaton): disease might simply proliferate, defying interpretations; pain 
could flare at random, like a sudden breeze turning gentle waves into whitecaps.  Symptoms 
thus remain, to some extent, inextricable from the daemonic.  It is now understood more as a 
“volatile economy of impersonal forces,” rather than a “divinized plane of reality.” (145)  The 
cavity appears as an unruly terrain aligned only contingently with health. 
The interpretation of symptoms also creates a practice (technē), however, that promises 
some degree of control over the diseases themselves.  Symptoms are not, after all, entirely ne-
gative: they can both confirm dangerous tendencies—wasting, loss of function, divergence 
from one’s “usual self”—but also mitigate signs of trouble with evidence such as color, con-
sistency, and healthy posture.  By interpreting symptoms, the ancient physician participates in 
a process that objectifies disease (identified through bad symptoms) as well as its potential 
opponents (identified through good ones) within medicine’s field of vision.  The promise of 
the medical technē, then, is to aid the forces of good against those of evil. Conscious, rational 
inquiry replaces the unconscious adjustments once made to meet disease. The physician be-
comes the privileged subject of knowledge, while the recognition and identification, the 
aisthēsis of the soma, provides his guide.  Human nature cannot balance itself naturally, as was 
once imagined, but requires the deliberate exercise of mastery over the natural world, a mas-
tery made possible by the physician’s knowledge.  
Out of this confrontation between medical science and unruly disease—a confrontation 
mediated by symptoms—emerges the idea of the care of the self.  As causality shifts from so-
cial and ethical agents to impersonal stuffs and forces, responsibility returns again to the 
person’s relationship to his sōma.  Now the embodied person holds responsibility for interpre-
ting corporeal signs; caring for the physical body becomes relevant to larger questions of 
autonomy.  While causality must remain divided between, on the one hand, corporeal stuffs 
and forces, and, on the other hand, the person with the power to manage them, an “ethical 
substance” requiring nurture emerges. (189)  Later arguments by figures such as Gorgias and 
Democritus show continuing concern about the tension between the nonhuman object and the 
human subject, a tension later embodied in the dualism of body (sōma) and soul (psukhē). 
The struggle to find ultimate responsibility for the actions and the sufferings of the 
human body appears most vividly on the tragic stage.  Tragedy illuminates the daemonic 
space inside the self and, on Holmes’ account, most thoroughly realizes “the potential of the 
symptom to generate meaning,” rather than simply reveal facts. (229)  Holmes shows how 
Euripides in particular engages the moral complexity of what it means to be a subject of the 
symptom in the late fifth century.  Euripides depicts the many meanings of Heracles’ madness 
through the plural interpretations its symptoms generate.  Similarly, Orestes’ madness ap-
pears quite different from its portrayal in Aeschylus’s Eumenides.  Rather than bringing the 
responsible Furies on stage, in Euripides’ play madness appears to have multiple causes, lin-
ked to multifarious symptoms, with even more horrific outcomes.  Just as the medical writers 
depicted a human as fractured into seen and unseen space, Euripides shatters Phaedra’s 
agency in Hippolytus, piecing the character’s fate from the anger of Aphrodite, a daemonic erōs, 
and her own strength to resist these forces—all rendered visible through her symptoms: a 
clouded brow, pallid skin, and weak and wasted form. (253) 
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The turn to tragedy also raises a question that Holmes never fully confronts, but which 
her marvelous inquiry elicits.  Can we speak meaningfully of a “subject”—as Holmes persists 
in doing—even when tragedy witnesses the subject’s eclipse at the hands of far greater forces? 
Holmes repeatedly emphasizes how her story chronicles the development of an “embodied 
subject,” citing Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Foucault (among others).  Here Holmes makes 
a genuine contribution: we see, thanks to her analysis, how the embodied subject of classical 
antiquity is defined by a rich and ambiguous sōma, one armed with medical technologies to 
interpret and care for itself.  However, while Holmes recognizes that embodiment shapes 
agency at an individual level, each of the philosophers she cites offers broader arguments for 
the necessity of understanding agency not merely at an individual level, but as part of a broa-
der interrelated whole, such as being-in-the-world, the flesh, or networks of power.  
To take one example, Foucault’s late work asks how to understand the embodied 
subject’s relationship to the world.  As Foucault suggests in The Use of Pleasure, “there is no 
specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct.”2  That is, the ethical 
agency which Holmes tracks in its genesis alongside the development of the soma, requires not 
just conceptual definition, but social and political practices to provide the conditions for this 
agency’s realization.  The technē of these medical writers does not stand apart from a unified 
moral conduct, from a form of life that provides the condition of the possibility of moral action 
as well as the practices of ethical formation that Foucault and Holmes both study.  Thus, I 
wonder: What form of life allowed for this complex and ambiguous portrait of the human to 
emerge through the Hippocratic writings, reflections by the likes of Gorgias and Democritus, 
and tragedy?  What world founded and surrounded the body’s emergence as a conceptual ob-
ject? 
Here Holmes might have said more about the uniqueness of the political community 
that made the development of an embodied subject possible.  As G.E.R. Lloyd has argued, the 
Athenian democratic polis provided the necessary condition for the rise of Greek philosophy 
and science.  Research by J.P. Vernant and Cornelius Castoriadis has advanced similar argu-
ments about the development of political philosophy, while recent books by Danielle Allen 
and Victoria Wohl have interwoven accounts of conceptual and political developments in 
democratic Athens.  Such work suggests that the background of widespread and sustained po-
litical participation realized in the democratic polis, not only facilitated, but also made possible 
precisely the habits of reflection and self-care that Holmes studies.  Tragedy provides a telling 
example.  The texts of Euripides were performed as part of a political institution in ancient 
Athens and each performance was preceded by dramatic displays of the democratic polis: the 
ten most important generals of Athens sacrificed piglets and poured out wine to the gods; men 
were recognized for their service; bars of silver were paraded across the stage to represent 
what enemies were now compelled to pay Athens; and war orphans whose fathers had died 
were honored.  Such a spectacle of self-affirmation as well as mourning created the conditions 
for Athenian citizens to confront the stark fictions about their bodies depicted in plays such as 
                                                 
2 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality, vol. 2, translated by Hurley (New York: 
Vintage, 1985), 28. 
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Hippolytus and Orestes.  Holmes brilliantly illuminates the conceptual development of the bo-
dy, but she leaves out the social and political world that made such changes imaginable. 
This request for a context concerning Holmes’ embodied subject, also leads to a ques-
tion about the practices Holmes does discuss:  What is the place of medicine’s authority, and, 
more importantly, the promise of its technē, in the democratic polis?  Critics of Foucault’s in-
quiry into the care of the self have argued that such practices described only a narrow segment 
of the population, making Foucault’s claims about the emergence of ethical substance 
exaggerated and misleading.  Holmes acknowledges that whereas dietetics—the habits of self-
care generated, as practical responses to illness—was democratic, medicine quickly assumed 
an élite status as a province of knowledge.  What role, then, did the care of the self actually 
play in the ordinary life of the political community?  Was it indeed marginal and élite, as cri-
tics of Foucault have suggested, or does its inclusion in the tragic festival indicate a broader 
significance—a significance that also, perhaps, depended on the democratic polity that sur-
rounded it? 
Holmes’ study leaves these questions unanswered, but her book is richly provocative. 
Moreover, she shows the need, not only for continuing to study antiquity, but also for prac-
ticing the kind of history of the present Foucault himself undertook.  With this book, Holmes 
writes that she wishes to “challenge the givenness” of the body, “both in the Greek world and 
in our own.” (40)  How then can we translate the subtle ideas of body, agency, and the ethics 
of care Holmes illuminates in antiquity to contemporary life?  What political and social chan-
ges might this necessitate?  I suspect that Foucault could help us here too. 
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